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5
Setting the Standards 




A key element in the design of performance measurement and ac-
countability systems is the establishment of appropriate benchmark 
levels (or standards) of performance to guide the evaluation of program 
outcomes. Performance benchmarks shape system incentives and infl u-
ence the responses of public managers and staff operating programs. In 
systems with rewards and sanctions linked to results, performing above 
or below the standards can have important short-term consequences 
(e.g., budgetary rewards or revisions, positive or negative recognition), 
as well as long-term ones (e.g., promotion, structural reorganization). 
In this chapter, we review the literature in information economics, 
contract theory (see, for example, Dixit [2002] and Prendergast [1999]), 
and public administration to draw out theoretical implications for the 
construction of performance standards in public organizations.1 We 
then assess alternative methods that are commonly used to construct 
performance standards and consider the relevance of these lessons for 
the design of performance measurement systems in public programs. 
An important premise of our work is that the method used to construct 
performance standards can change the way employees behave and in-
fl uence the internal effi ciency of organizations. Focusing in particular 
on performance benchmarking in U.S. workforce training programs 
(i.e., JTPA and WIA programs), we assess whether the design of perfor-
mance standards in these programs is effi cient and consistent with basic 
principles derived from theory. 
The exercise of performance assessment clearly serves impor-
tant functions in public organizations other than promoting effi ciency. 
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Marshall et al. (2000) describes three primary functions: 1) account-
ability for public expenditures, 2) the production of comparative 
information to inform customer choices in public services, and 3) 
improvement of professional practice and program management. For 
example, public managers may use performance information to identify 
best practices and to communicate to outside constituencies legitimate 
information about organizational achievements. We acknowledge the 
possibility that the introduction of performance measurement may 
transform organizations through channels other than those we discuss 
in our literature review. We likewise recognize that political and ethical 
concerns also infl uence the construction of performance standards and 
the use of performance data. We discuss these issues to a greater extent 




We frame our discussion in terms of the principal-agent model, a 
theoretical framework commonly applied in the economics and public 
administration literatures. There are critics of this model who argue that 
it overemphasizes the self-seeking behavior of agents and neglects so-
cial interactions and motivators. In his classic study of organizations, 
Thompson (1967), for example, describes the importance of cliques, 
social controls based on informal norms and status that infl uence the 
performance of organizations. Similarly, stewardship theory empha-
sizes collective goals and public managers “whose motives are aligned 
with the objectives of their principals,” or who highly value coop-
erative behavior even when their interests and those of the principal 
diverge (Davis, Donaldson, and Schoorman 1997, p. 21). Although we 
acknowledge the roles of social and cultural norms and the infl uence 
of political and personal power relationships as described in these al-
ternative theoretical frameworks, we rely primarily on principal-agent 
theory in modeling behavior and relationships in this study.
In our application of principal-agent theory to the study of per-
formance standards systems, we call the party who designs the 
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measurement system the principal and the party whose performance is 
measured the agent. We denote the measured performance P, and the 
benchmark level of performance, or the performance standard, P0. The 
difference between the performance outcome (P) and the performance 
standard (P0) is denoted ∆P, that is, ∆P = P − P0. 
We are interested in the methods that are used to construct the 
performance benchmark P0 and in the kind of information that these 
methods incorporate in the benchmark. Although we recognize that 
there may not exist a single method of construction that could be ef-
fectively applied in all situations, we still believe that some methods are 
largely more effective than others. We say that a standard is poorly con-
structed or “ineffective” if it is missing key pieces of information and/
or if it is likely to send the wrong signals and to stimulate behavioral 
responses with negative implications. In addition, we recognize that, 
in practice, organizations will often use multidimensional measure-
ment systems with multiple measures and performance benchmarks. 
Although we explicitly discuss these issues, for the sake of conciseness, 
we focus in our literature review on the simplest case with a single 
performance measure, as this is suffi cient to highlight the main lessons 
from the literature without loss of generality. 
We assume that the agent has some control over the performance 
outcome, and following the economics literature, effort constitutes the 
agent’s choices and exertions that infl uence the performance outcome. 
We denote the effort choice e and assume that higher effort levels in-
crease the performance outcome, that is, P(e) increases with e. We 
model effort as a one-dimensional choice by the agent. It is useful, 
however, to think of e as a vector of activities; the agent chooses not 
only how hard to work, but also how to allocate her time and effort 
across different activities. For example, in job training centers, case- 
workers allocate their efforts toward recruiting participants, assessing 
their training “needs,” networking with other social service organiza-
tions and managing contracts with external vendors, and bookkeeping, 
to name a few of their activities. The lessons we draw from our model 
based on a simple formulation—assuming that e is a scalar—are robust 
to this more realistic assumption. 
In the simplest formulation, performance is equal to effort P = e, 
and value added is equal to P = e − P0. We think of value added here 
as the agent’s contribution to the principal’s welfare, net of costs. In 
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the case of a job training program, assuming its objective is to raise the 
earnings and employability of the poor, value added is the value of the 
labor market skills enrollees acquire due to the exertions of training 
center workers, net of training costs.
As discussed above, setting the absolute level of the performance 
standard is a critical task in performance measurement systems. In 
the federal programs we study—JTPA and WIA—and others since 
the U.S. Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, 
government offi cials are required to undertake this task annually. We 
assume (consistent with practice in these programs) that the perfor-
mance standard determines the level of acceptable performance below 
which sanctions are imposed and above which rewards are given. By 
increasing the standard, the principal boosts incentives to improve 
performance, because the agent has to supply more effort to meet the 
standard and avoid sanctions. 
Large or incessant increases in the standard, however, also dimin-
ish the credibility of the measurement system, with the consequence 
that the agent may simply give up or search for alternative, possibly 
unproductive ways to increase measured performance. In our model, 
we assume that the agent receives a level of compensation that is in-
dependent of performance, and we defi ne the level of effort that one 
would expect for that base compensation as e0. In an effi ciently func-
tioning system, prevailing competitive forces determine this level of 
effort. In other words, it is the amount of effort a representative agent 
would expect to exert for the base level of compensation. In this case, 
the performance standard is set at the level of performance that occurs 
when the agent provides the competitive level of effort, P0 = P(e0).
The rationale behind setting the performance standard at this level 
is that if the performance standard were set above P(e0), then the prin-
cipal would be unable to attract and retain the agent. Agents would 
not apply or compete for the job or contract. On the other hand, if the 
performance standard were set below P(e0), the principal would be 
overcompensating the agent.
To illustrate this defi nition of the performance standard, consider 
a simple manufacturing production example. We use this example 
because manual work constitutes the occupational class where perfor-
mance benchmarking was fi rst used in a systematic way (and is still 
common practice). Taylor (1911) was perhaps its most famous early 
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proponent. His ideas arose from his experience as a machinist in a steel 
plant. Miller (1992, p. 102) also used a piece-rate production setting 
to analyze “managerial dilemmas” and to consider how an incentive 
system could “harness individual self-interest in pursuit of organiza-
tional goals,” “transforming an organizational social dilemma into an 
organizational ‘invisible hand.’” This choice of example is without loss 
of generality, as we will argue that the problems that arise with the 
construction of performance standards in public organizations do not 
fundamentally differ from those arising in production manufacturing.
Suppose a manual worker in a factory is paid a wage (w) per hour. 
The wage is paid independently of the level of worker performance. 
In addition to the fi xed wage, the principal may wish to reward the 
worker for superior performance and impose sanctions for inferior 
performance. The number of pieces the worker produces per hour is 
by itself insuffi cient to assess whether to reward or sanction the agent. 
One way to address this question is to conduct time-and-motion stud-
ies to establish a benchmark level of performance, or an hourly rate, 
P0 = e0(w), which a representative worker earning w would achieve, and 
then use this benchmark to evaluate actual performance. In other words, 
the principal actually assesses the level of performance that occurs un-
der competitive effort and uses this information to set the performance 
standard. The difference between the worker’s performance and the 
performance standard is used as a measure of value added. Under that 
interpretation, value added corresponds to what the agent adds, because 
of superior effort, to what we would expect to prevail in the market. 
This method of establishing the performance standard requires es-
timating the production technology available to the agent, that is, the 
relation between effort and outcomes. Once this relationship is un-
derstood, it is possible to infer the agent’s excess effort relative to the 
competitive level of effort. Counterfactual experiments such as time-
and-motion studies, however, are practical only in a few occupations 
that typically involve manual work. Many public and private sector 
work situations involve nonmanual work, complex group interactions, 
and nonstandardized outputs, making experimental studies to construct 
counterfactual performance benchmarks very costly. 
These complications mean that the methods typically used to 
construct performance standards are imperfect. Real world methods 
necessarily balance the cost of establishing fair and appropriate stan-
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dards and the expected return to the organization from assessing value 
added more precisely; and of course, in the “real world,” non-economic 
factors—e.g., political goals, legislative requirements, etc.—may also 
infl uence standard setting processes. These challenges and trade-offs 
will become evident in the case study analysis of the JTPA and WIA 
performance standards that follow. First, however, we review a set of 
generic problems that any method of setting performance targets must 
address. 
Leveling the Playing Field
Thus far, we have considered the case of a principal who manages 
a single agent working in a single environment. It often happens, how-
ever, that the agent works in multiple environments or that the principal 
manages multiple agents who face different work conditions. To illus-
trate, we return to the time-and-motion study example presented above 
and assume that there are multiple workers assigned to different ma-
chines. We also assume that the machines vary in their productivity in 
the sense that the amount of effort required to produce a unit of output 
varies by machine. (One might model this idea formally by defi ning 
the performance outcome from machine k when effort is e as P(e) = 
ke, where k > 0 and k is different from machine to machine.) Assume 
that each machine’s productivity is known to both the principal and the 
agent.
If the agent is allowed to refuse to work on a machine, the principal 
must factor the difference in marginal products of effort across agents 
into the determination of the performance standard. In fact, if the prin-
cipal sets the same performance standard for all machines, say, P0 = e0, 
then the agent will only agree to work with machines that exhibit high 
marginal productivities. An important point is that time-and-motion 
studies would have to be conducted in each work environment to con-
trol for the special circumstances of the environment that are commonly 
observed by the principal and the agent. 
Consider, for example, the job-training caseworker with the respon-
sibility to assess clients and place them into jobs at a rate required by 
the performance standard. The caseworker will prefer to work with the 
most motivated and capable clients and direct them into the most effec-
tive employment preparation activities. Consequently, in the absence of 
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adjustments to the standard, the caseworker would respond by discrimi-
nating against low-ability enrollees and directing only the higher-ability 
trainees into services with the highest measured performance outcomes 
(e.g., job-placement activities).
Insurance and Uncontrollable Risk
The time-and-motion study example assumed no uncertainty about 
the worker’s performance outcome. Consider a more realistic example 
where the worker produces a number of pieces that depend on his or 
her effort and also on some external shock or infl uence, for example, 
a power outage that slows production (or in the job-training example, 
an economic recession that dampens job placement success). The per-
formance outcome is now equal to P + ∆ and the worker’s value added 
is ∆P = (P + ε− P0 , where  is a mean zero random variable that is 
realized only after the agent has chosen his or her level of effort. Setting 
the standard at a level that does not take into account these circum-
stances or context implies that a worker who supplies the effort level 
that is required to achieve the performance standard will sometimes 
overperform and other times underperform relative to the standard. In 
this situation, value added is equal to ∆P = ∆when e = e0 . Outside 
shocks do not infl uence the worker’s choice of effort because additional
effort still increases expected performance. They do, however, change 
the realized level of performance and value added, and therefore, the 
worker’s compensation. 
Although a risk-neutral worker will not suffer any disutility from 
this variation in compensation, a risk-averse worker will, and this es-
tablishes a fi rst rationale to construct as fair a performance standard as 
possible. The merit of performance standards will depend in part on 
their ability to control for outside risk (i.e., circumstances beyond the 
control of public managers or staff). The logic of agency theory is that 
standards that properly account for external infl uences reduce compen-
sation risk, thereby increasing the agents’ welfare. Lowering the risk 
faced by the agent is also desirable for the principal, as it means that he 
does not have to offer the agent a higher wage to compensate for risk 
bearing. 
The key challenge for performance standards system designers is 
to identify the sources of controllable versus uncontrollable factors that 
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infl uence the performance outcome. In other words, it is important to 
hold the worker responsible for effort, e, but not for external infl uences, 
. At the same time, the principal does not want to discount factors 
that are within the agent’s control. For example, the principal does not 
want to lower the performance standard in the event that the worker’s 
machine breaks down if the agent might have anticipated and prevented 
the breakdown. In the context of the job-training example, the prin-
cipal does want to hold the caseworker responsible for (and reward) 
efforts made to appropriately assess clients and facilitate better worker-
employer matches. But it would be unfair and ineffi cient to penalize 
the caseworker (or job-training center) for a lower rate of worker-
employer matches if it is due to a declining number of labor market 
(job) opportunities. 
As suggested above, though, risk aversion is not the only reason the 
agent may experience disutility from performance standards that fail 
to control for outside risks. Another closely related concern is fairness. 
The issue of income variability drives the concern under risk aversion, 
while other considerations, such as interpersonal comparisons, may 
foster concerns about fairness. For example, the agent may experience 
more disutility from an idiosyncratic shock that lowers only her per-
formance and not the performance of her coworkers, compared to a 
group shock that lowers all workers’ performance. The former shock 
generates different treatments amongst individuals who have essen-
tially behaved identically. As under risk aversion, if workers value 
fairness, the principal benefi ts from discounting factors that are outside 
the worker’s control. 
Hidden Information, Adverse Selection, and Distortions
We show in the previous section that in setting performance stan-
dards, the principal may want to take into account information about 
shocks that infl uence the performance outcome and that are outside the 
agent’s control. These shocks are observed only after the agent has cho-
sen a level of effort, implying that they do not infl uence this choice. We 
now consider a different kind of information that plays an important 
role in the construction of performance standards. This information is 
observed only by the agent, and not by the principal, and it is observed 
before the agent chooses his/her level of effort. For example, assume 
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that when the agent is assigned to a new machine, she alone knows the 
productivity of that machine and can use this information to make her 
effort choice. We say that the information is privately known by the 
agent, and consistent with the literature, we characterize such situations 
as hidden information (Holmstrom 1982; Miller 1992).  
Hidden information further complicates the problem of setting 
standards. To illustrate, we return to the job training program example 
and again assume that the training efforts of caseworkers in this pro-
gram are evaluated in part according to the rate at which their clients 
secure jobs. Caseworkers observe relevant information about applicants 
on the likely success of training investments, (e.g., personal motivation 
and employment barriers). Based on this information, the caseworkers 
can predict how likely the applicant is to obtain employment by the end 
of training. Assume furthermore that those applicants who are more 
likely to perform well on the performance measure are not necessarily 
those who benefi t most from training. Indeed, some applicants to the 
job-training program may be highly likely to obtain employment on 
their own. As a result the caseworkers may overinvest in easy-to-serve 
applicants and underinvest in hard-to-serve ones, and it may be impos-
sible for the principal to correct these investment distortions. 
For example, a given effort level e could produce performance out-
come P = e + h, where h < 0 if a hard-to-serve participant is enrolled, 
and h > 0 if an easy-to-serve participant is enrolled. We denote hidden 
information by h to distinguish this kind of information from infor-
mation that is publicly known, such as the information about varying 
productivities of machines. If the caseworker observes the applicants’ 
type, he has an incentive to enroll only easy-to-serve applicants because 
they produce better outcomes.
In fact, the only way the principal could try to correct these distor-
tions would be by controlling for the type of applicants who have been 
served, adjusting upward the performance of those agents who have 
enrolled a larger fraction of hard-to-serve applicants. By assumption, 
however, only the agent knows this information. If the principal were to 
ask the agent what type of participants he has enrolled, the agent would 
have an incentive to report enrolling only hard-to-serve enrollees, and 
the principal would have no way to verify that the agent is telling the 
truth. 
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Practically speaking, the principal could correct these distortions 
by developing a specifi c measure to target the hard-to-serve groups, 
for example, using observable variables such as welfare recipient or 
limited English profi ciency as proxies for “hard-to-serve.” This would 
assume that welfare recipients or nonnative English speakers are harder 
to serve because they require higher investments for equal outcomes. 
The principal could set a lower performance standard for these indi-
viduals, for example, P0’ = e0 − h, where P0’ < P0 by construction. Of 
course, we know that not all welfare recipients (or nonnative English 
speakers) are identical; some are easier to serve than others, and the 
agent observes this information. Again, the agent will be inclined to 
select a nonrepresentative sample of these groups. This implies that the 
principal has corrected some distortions because the agent’s attention 
is now focused on a needier target population, but the agent will still 
select those applicants who are the easiest to serve within these sub-
populations of applicants.
Note that a slightly different problem from hidden information, 
known as adverse selection in the literature, occurs when there are mul-
tiple agents who are privately informed. In our example, it could be 
the case that different agents face different costs, observed privately, of 
meeting the standard. In the job training case, this happens when there 
are multiple caseworkers who face different eligible populations, and 
when the caseworkers privately observe this information. The distinc-
tion between adverse selection and hidden information has to do with 
the point in time when the agent becomes privately informed. Under 
hidden information, the agent becomes privately informed after agree-
ing to the contract, while under adverse selection, the agent is informed 
before agreeing to the contract. As a consequence, adverse selection 
introduces the possibility that the agent’s private information will infl u-
ence the agent’s decision to accept the contract or not. 
To illustrate, assume that the principal offers all agents the option 
to run special programs that are only for hard-to-serve populations. The 
principal lowers the standards for these special programs, and using our 
terminology, this would constitute a new optional contract. The agent 
agrees or declines to participate. The agents will choose to run such 
programs on the basis of their private information about the population 
they face. Presumably, the agents who face the best chances to meet the 
lower performance standards will decide to run such programs. How-
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ever, these agents may not be those who generate the highest returns 
from the principal’s perspective. The agent’s selection rule poses a 
problem when it does not correspond to the rule that the principal would 
use, had the principal had the same information as the agent.
Multiple Principals
Another distinctive feature of performance standards systems in the 
public sector is the greater likelihood that agents will work for more 
than one principal. In the context of public organizations, one should 
think of principals as a widely defi ned category that includes all con-
stituencies or interest groups that may infl uence the actions of the agent, 
either directly through explicit rewards or indirectly through more sub-
tle channels. For example, in the context of our application to the JTPA 
and WIA programs, Congress, the USDOL, and state governments 
would be the main principals, since these are the actors who directly de-
fi ne the goals and activities of the organization, both through the design 
of the incentive system, performance standards, and also through other 
organizational features. But local politicians, private industry council 
representatives, and other interest groups should also be viewed as sec-
ondary principals, since these parties likewise have roles in infl uencing 
training program priorities and agency actions. 
The key implication of the presence of multiple principals is in-
creased complexity in the incentive system, particularly if the interests 
of the different principals are not aligned, e.g., emphasizing different 
priorities or outcomes. The agent has to choose how to allocate his/her 
effort level e across the various goals or objectives of the principals, 
which might be represented in a performance standards system by mul-
tiple standards, P1 , P2 , P3 , etc. 
Dixit (2002) proposes an analysis of multiple principals compet-
ing noncooperatively for the agent’s effort. As expected, the agent will 
allocate more effort toward the objectives of principals who compen-
sate at a higher rate (or provide greater rewards for achievement in 
some form or another). In other words, if w1 > w2 , then e1 > e2 and P1 
= e1(w1) > P2 = e2(w2); performance is higher on the outcome set by the 
principal who calls for P1 and provides greater rewards for its achieve-
ment. Dixit demonstrates that the marginal level of effort applied by the 
agent (e1 , e2 , e3 , etc.) toward the achievement of the various outcomes 
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will be decreasing in the number of principals. The reason is simply 
that each principal will reward the agent for success on the particular 
dimension(s) of effort that concern him or her, but he will also insure 
the agent against failure on dimensions of effort that concern the other 
principals. If principals choose the level of incentive noncooperatively, 
the desire to insure the agent will confl ict with the desire to provide 
incentives. 
In investigating how the principals compete for the agent’s effort, 
Dixit also shows that the declines in agents’ marginal level of effort 
(as the number of principals increases) will be exacerbated if the ef-
forts across principals’ objectives are substitutes. In other words, the 
principals undermine one another, and the impact of the incentives is 
diminished. In equilibrium, all principals call for effort, but since ef-
forts are substitutable, the incentive effects on total effort are reduced.
Dixit’s analysis calls for two recommendations for organizational 
design. First, one should allocate and organize tasks across agents based 
on whether they are complements or substitutes. Complementary ac-
tivities can be grouped together, but the grouping of substitute activities 
should be avoided. In the context of the JTPA program, if there are 
some principals who are more concerned about equity of allocation 
(local government) and others more concerned about effi ciency (the 
federal government), then it may be optimal to divide up the functions 
of enrollment and training and to assign each of these activities to two 
separate agencies. 
In addition, the model has implications for how the principals 
should be allowed to compete. In particular, the principal i should not 
be permitted to excuse or cover for the agent’s poor performance toward 
meeting principal j’s objective. This “compartmentalization principle” 
has implications in a public organization. Consider, for example, the 
confl ict between enrollment and training in the JTPA program described 
above, and assume that the proposed solution of breaking up these tasks 
is not feasible for administrative or practical reasons. In this situation, 
the principals who are concerned primarily with reaching hard-to-serve 
populations will try to set the performance standard in such a way that 
training agencies are not penalized for achieving low performance out-
comes. Similarly, principals who care mainly about effi ciency will try 
to minimize the emphasis placed on enrollment choices. A possible re-
sult would be that agencies would face low performance standards and 
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no constraints on enrollment. To avoid this outcome, one would want 
to minimize principals’ interference with one another in the setting of 
performance standards.
 Although there is considerable discussion of “multidimensional-
ity” or multiple principals in the literature, there is little mention of 
situations in which there may be a hierarchy among the principals. 
The political science literature discusses “political multidimensional-
ity” and the diffi culty of identifying an “ultimate principal,” e.g., the 
competing interests of House and Senate chambers, committees, and 
other political actors that have implications for the stability of agents’ 
behavior (Maltzman and Smith 1994). However, it is also possible that 
in a political hierarchy such as that established in the JTPA system, 
with service providers taking signals from local job-training authorities 
and state and federal policy directives at the same time, agents might 
allocate their efforts toward alternative objectives of these principals 
according to the principals’ position in this hierarchy. 
Dynamic Issues
Measurement systems are often changed from time to time. There 
are many reasons why the principal may update performance standards. 
First, the principal may want to set low standards when a new perfor-
mance measure is introduced to give the agent time to adjust to the 
change. Second, the principal may correct performance measurement 
systems as she acquires new information about the effectiveness of dif-
ferent measurement schemes or about the infl uence of external factors 
on performance. Third, the principal may revise the standard to account 
for changes in the environment or in the production technology. 
The agent will take into account the possibility of future changes, 
and most importantly, the fact that current performance outcomes may 
be used in setting future standards. In both the JTPA and WIA pro-
grams, this has been a central component of the performance standard 
setting process. The WIA legislation explicitly identifi es “continuous 
performance improvement,” in which performance targets increase 
each year, as a central tenet of the performance standards system. Such 
a rule also implicitly exists in any organization that uses past agent per-
formance to estimate the production function and set standards for the 
present. Assume the agent systematically outperforms the standard, and 
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the principal consequently increases it. It could be that the agent was 
outperforming the standard because the agent was exerting exceptional 
effort. The agent will then anticipate that current performance infl u-
ences future standards. The natural response to such a rule is to stop 
supplying high effort because it increases the standard (and the level of 
effort required to obtain the same reward in the future). Thus, a simple 
static view of incentive systems may fail to capture such behavioral 
responses that arise only when one considers the dynamic nature of 
performance measurement.
In the economics and management literature, this phenomenon 
is known as the ratchet effect (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987; Miller 
1992). The agent’s belief about the principal’s policies regarding future 
standards will signifi cantly infl uence his behavior and the success of 
the incentive system. To eliminate the ratchet effect, the agent must 
trust that the principal will not change the standard. Trust is more likely 
to develop under repeated interactions when the principal can create a 
reputation for not reneging on the contract. Miller (1992, p. 157) like-
wise recognizes the importance of trust in these situations, noting that 
“‘trustworthiness’ on the part of managers seems to be a necessary ele-
ment of an effective incentive system.” Another way the principal can 
eliminate the ratchet effect is by committing to never change a standard, 
or more realistically, by committing to strict rules for changing the stan-
dard. Such commitment is likely to eliminate fear of the ratchet effect 
and reinforce incentives for effort. 
OVERVIEW OF PERFORMANCE STANDARD–
SETTING APPROACHES
We now present a brief overview of alternative methods for con-
structing performance standards (informed by the theoretical discussion 
above) and consider the environments where these methods are likely 
to work well.
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Estimating the Production Function
Most basically, the principal (or public agency) can attempt to es-
timate the production function (i.e., the level of productivity expected 
from a given level of effort) to set the standard. It is sometimes possible 
to establish a standard through experimentation or through statistical 
methods. Such an approach will only be valid, however, for produc-
tion processes that are stable over time and across environments. This 
is relatively rare, for example, in public social service provision. The 
use of data on past performance outcomes to construct estimates of the 
production function is a more common application of this method. A 
potential problem with this method, as discussed earlier, is the introduc-
tion of a ratchet effect if higher performance outcomes increase future 
standards. This method is also unlikely to work well in nonstationary 
environments where the production technology is subject to transient 
shocks. 
Relative Performance Evaluation
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is possible when the princi-
pal manages multiple agents. RPE can take many forms. In one form, the 
principal ranks the agent’s performance as in a tournament (e.g., akin to 
the Job Corps Center annual performance rankings). Alternatively, the 
principal could compare the agent’s performance to the average per-
formance among all agents who perform the same work. RPE works 
well for “insurance purposes” because it controls for shocks that are 
common to all agents. In this way, the model provides a rationale for 
benchmarking by comparing performance across similar workers/agen-
cies, as called for by some public administration scholars (Hatry 1999). 
Of course, this method has its limitations, too, in that it may exacerbate 
competition and may also result in wasteful behaviors (e.g., sabotage, 
monitoring others, etc.). 
Negotiating the Standard
With this method, the principal and agent negotiate (agree on) 
the performance standard. If objective information on the production 
function is absent and relative performance evaluation is not a viable al-
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ternative, this may be the only solution available. This approach requires 
an environment of mutual trust between the agent and principal(s), i.e., 
one in which the agent does not withhold important information about 
her effort and capabilities, and where the principal can be trusted to use 
performance information fairly, e.g., not to increase the standard in the 
event of performance outcomes above the standard. The resulting per-
formance standard (and the corresponding distribution of risk between 
the principal and agent) may be more a function of the relative bargain-
ing ability of the parties, however, rather than refl ecting principles of 
effective performance standard setting processes. 
PERFORMANCE-STANDARD SETTING IN FEDERAL
JOB-TRAINING PROGRAMS
In the U.S. government’s largest job-training program, individual 
providers of government training have been evaluated by their per-
formance relative to specifi c, numerical standards. Congress has also 
legislated important changes in the formulation of these numerical 
standards, as described in Chapter 4. A major redesign of the program 
fi ve years ago introduced an entirely different approach to setting 
performance standards, and we will devote considerable attention 
to the implications of these changes for the system’s incentives and 
functioning.
Under JTPA, Congress, the USDOL, and state authorities shared 
in designing and implementing the program’s incentive policies. The 
Labor Department established expected performance levels using a 
regression-based model with national departure points. States could 
use the optional department adjustment model or develop their own ad-
justment procedures, although the state-developed procedures and any 
adjustments made by the governor had to conform to the USDOL’s pa-
rameters (see Chapter 4 and Social Policy Research Associates [1999]). 
A majority of states adopted these models and used the USDOL-
provided performance standards worksheets to determine performance 
targets (some with modifi cations). 
The WIA program that replaced JTPA in 2000 introduced a new 
approach to setting performance standards that involves the negotia-
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tion of performance targets. States negotiate with the USDOL and local 
workforce investment areas to establish performance standards, us-
ing estimates based on historical data (or past performance) that are 
intended to take into account differences in economic conditions, par-
ticipant characteristics, and services delivered. The pretext for making 
this change to a system of negotiated standards was to promote “shared 
accountability,” described as one of the “guiding principles” of WIA 
(USDOL 2001, p. 8). 
In our case analysis of the JTPA and WIA performance measure-
ment systems, the USDOL, Congress, and the states constitute multiple 
principals in the organizational structure, while local implementing 
authorities (in government entities or training centers) function as the 
agents, undertaking the business of enrolling, training, and fi nding em-
ployment for the program clients. Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 (p. 22) shows 
the performance measures currently in effect in the WIA program and 
also indicates which of these are new to WIA (i.e., that were not used in 
the JTPA program). 
Determining the Base Level of Performance
The fi rst challenge in setting performance standards is to establish 
the “counterfactual” level of performance, i.e., the level of performance 
that would occur under a competitive level of effort. Consider for ex-
ample the entered employment rate measure. What employment rate 
outcome would an agent who supplies a competitive level of effort 
achieve? 
In general, the USDOL has attempted to address this question 
through the use of data on past performance. For example, prior to the 
start of JTPA, the Labor Department collected performance data on out-
comes during the fi nal years of the training program that preceded JTPA 
and used these data to determine the performance standards in the fi rst 
year of JTPA. Now assume that past performance in a representative 
training environment gives a distribution of performance, and that dif-
ferences in performance outcomes are due only to differences in effort. 
Then if the department believes that only 50 percent of the training 
centers have supplied at least the competitive level of effort, the perfor-
mance standard should be set at the 50th percentile of the distribution 
of past performance.
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In the JTPA measurement system, the performance standard was set 
at the outcome produced by the training center at the 25th percentile of 
performance among all training centers nationwide. Thus, the USDOL 
evaluated a training center’s effort, e, against an effort level e’, that cor-
responded to the effort level of the training center at the 25th percentile 
of systemwide performance. An interpretation of this choice is that 25 
percent of the training centers in the previous program were not supplying 
a competitive level of effort. 
Under WIA, the more systematic approach for setting standards 
described above was abandoned. With discretion for setting perfor-
mance standards transferred to the negotiation process between states 
and localities, the use of past performance information varied widely. 
The USDOL did provide some guidance for negotiated targets un-
der WIA using data on the performance of seven early implementing 
states. However, among the majority of states that used baseline per-
formance measures in determining appropriate levels for the standards, 
the sources of these data differed considerably. The various types of 
data used included the projected national averages for the negotiated 
standards provided by the Labor Department; federal baseline numbers 
(available in the federal performance tracking system, i.e., Standard-
ized Program Information Reporting [SPIR] data); unemployment 
insurance (UI) data; and states’ own performance baselines from pre-
vious program years. Georgia, for example, used program year (PY) 
1998 state performance records combined with the projected national 
averages in negotiations with regional offi ce representatives and local-
level offi cials to determine the performance targets for the fi rst three 
years of WIA. Some states, such as New Hampshire and Ohio, used 
UI data from earlier periods (PY 1994–1997) combined with USDOL 
performance data available in the SPIR to set performance levels. These 
considerable differences across states in the performance standard set-
ting process have important implications for the ability of the principal 
to create a level playing fi eld for all agents.
Is the Playing Field Level?
Although our discussion thus far has centered on a representative 
training center, there are important differences across centers in the 
populations from which they draw their enrollees and in their labor mar-
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kets. For example, training centers located in relatively depressed labor 
markets should reasonably expect lower performance outcomes than 
those located in relatively tight labor markets. The USDOL recognized 
this problem and provided states with a method to adjust standards that 
took into account features of the training center’s population and envi-
ronment that may have been correlated with the performance outcome. 
Under JTPA, this method established the 25th percentile only as a 
starting or departure point. For each training center, the departure point 
was adjusted using a regression model, taking into account the extent 
that the training center’s characteristics differed from the average train-
ing center’s characteristics. Thus, continuing the above example, the 
adjustment approach would lower the entered employment rate stan-
dard for training centers in depressed job markets relative to those in 
robust ones. 
In the WIA program, the formal performance standards adjustment 
models were discarded by nearly all of the states (the exceptions being 
Texas, Maryland, and the District of Columbia). At the same time, the 
USDOL instructed states to take into account differences in economic 
conditions, participant characteristics, and services provided. For a 
majority, these adjustments to standards were made informally during 
the review of past performance data and in negotiations. For example, 
Wisconsin reported using PY 1997 data and the projected averages in 
negotiations with local offi cials to set the standards. A comparison of 
these data shows that when Wisconsin’s PY 1997 baseline was above 
the projected national averages, the projected averages were established 
as the targets. When Wisconsin’s baseline numbers were below the pro-
jected national averages, the baseline values were typically set as the 
targets. Other states (e.g., Washington, Nebraska, South Carolina, and 
others) followed a similar process. 
Adjusting for Uncontrollable Risks
In addition to accounting for factors (demographic, economic, or 
others) known at the time that performance standards are established, it 
is important to allow for adjustments to standards that will offset future 
or unknown risks of poor performance due to conditions or circum-
stances beyond the control of agents. In other words, the adjustment 
methodology should also correct for the risk generated by a random 
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shock (ε) in the model. While exceptional performance is still an unbi-
ased estimator of excess effort even in the presence of a random shock, 
such a shock introduces noise in the measure of value added, and there-
fore in the training center’s award. Because of risk-averse training staff 
and uncertain budgets, it is in the principal’s interest to formulate per-
formance standards that control both for persistent differences across 
training centers and transitory or idiosyncratic shocks. 
As described above, many states used past performance data to set 
performance standards for the fi rst year of the WIA program. In addi-
tion, most states also built in anticipated performance improvements 
for the two subsequent years. However, economic conditions changed 
signifi cantly between the pre-WIA period and fi rst three years of the 
program’s implementation. Between 1998 and 1999, unemployment 
rates were declining on average, with 75 percent of all states experienc-
ing a decline. Then between 2000 and 2001, this trend reversed. More 
than 75 percent of the states experienced an increase in unemployment 
rates, and the increases were even greater between 2001 and 2002, fol-
lowing the September 2001 World Trade Center terrorist attacks.2 As 
unemployment rates were increasing in the fi rst three years of WIA 
(from 3.94 percent to 5.35 percent, on average) and creating adverse 
labor market conditions for trainees, the standards for performance 
achievement in the program were also increasing (from 66.44 percent 
to 70.94 percent, on average). 
Year-to-year variations in job availability typically cannot be antici-
pated by training centers, much less an economic shock of the magnitude 
precipitated by the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, by adjust-
ing a training center’s standards for the local unemployment rate each 
year, the variance in performance due to unpredictable changes in the 
environment is reduced. And although these types of adjustments were 
made in the JTPA system, they were not standard practice under WIA. 
A 2002 GAO report confi rmed that WIA program administrators were 
seriously concerned about their ability to meet performance targets. All 
state program administrators reported that some of the performance 
targets were set too high for them and that the performance standards 
negotiation processes did not allow for adequate adjustments to varying 
economic conditions and participant demographics. In fact, the propor-
tion of states meeting or exceeding their performance standards dropped 
between PY 2001 and PY 2002 for nearly all measures, some dramati-
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cally, such as the 21 percent decrease in the proportion of states meeting 
their older youth entered employment rates (see Table 5.1).
Cream Skimming and Quick Fixes
The pressures generated by a high-stakes performance measure-
ment system can lead to undesirable behavioral responses on the part of 
agents. The performance standards under both JTPA and WIA were not 
only “noisy,” but they were also vulnerable to manipulation by agents. 
One way to increase P − P0 (and the corresponding performance award) 
was to increase effort. Another way to increase P − P0 that required no 
additional effort, however, was to select among the eligible applicants 
only the high-h types. That is, training centers might enroll persons who 
would produce high employment rates and earnings, even in the absence 
of training. This behavior has been called cream skimming (in addition 
to Chapter 6, see, e.g., Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond [1993]; 
Table 5.1  Percent of States Meeting or Exceeding Their Negotiated
Performance Standards in PYs 2000–2002
Performance measure/standard PY 2000 PY 2001 PY 2002
Adult entered employment rate 56.7 66.5 61.5
Adult employment retention rate 54.0 60.7 57.7
Adult earnings change 49.3 64.6 48.1
Adult credential rate 36.7 45.6 46.2
Dislocated worker entered employment rate 52.7 65.5 55.8
Dislocated worker employment retention rate 42.0 58.7 51.9
Dislocated worker earning replacement rate 54.7 74.8 61.5
Dislocated worker credential rate 36.7 58.7 55.8
Older youth entered employment rate 58.7 63.6 42.3
Older youth employment retention rate 52.0 61.2 48.1
Older youth earnings change 52.7 64.6 59.6
Older youth credential rate 29.3 31.6 23.1
Younger youth retention rate 38.0 59.2 57.7
Younger youth skill attainment rate 72.0 69.4 53.9
Younger youth diploma rate 25.3 45.6 50.0
Employer satisfaction 45.3 75.7 69.2
Participant satisfaction 51.3 78.6 76.9
SOURCE: Heinrich (2004).
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Cragg [1997]; Heckman and Smith [2003]; and Heckman, Smith, and 
Taber [1996]).
To prevent cream skimming, the USDOL adjusted the JTPA 
standards for the effects of the characteristics of enrollees on P. As il-
lustrated in Chapter 4, the adjustment method compensated training 
centers for enrolling persons such as the handicapped who tended to 
lower posttraining employment rates and earnings outcomes. Training 
centers that enrolled lower than average numbers of welfare recipients 
and handicapped were required to achieve higher standards. That is, the 
USDOL adjusted performance standards for the effect of the training 
center’s enrollment policies on P.
These adjustments under JTPA, which apparently did not fully ac-
count for all low-h characteristics, may have reduced cream-skimming 
behavior, but they did not eliminate it (Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 
[2002]). In addition, the adjustment method did not account for train-
ing centers’ choices about the training services made available. Thus, 
the performance measures generated incentives to emphasize short-run, 
“quick fi x”–type job placement activities in lieu of longer-term activi-
ties with more training content (Courty and Marschke 2003). Courty 
and Marschke (1997, 2004a) also showed how program managers 
strategically managed their “trainee inventories” and timed participant 
program exits to maximize end of the year performance levels. For a 
more detailed overview of the fi ndings described in this subsection, see 
Chapters 6 and 7.
Implications of Multiple Principals
The federal government’s efforts to encourage service delivery to the 
hard-to-serve and the provision of more intensive training activities were 
also frustrated by the presence of multiple principals with differing priori-
ties. Although state authorities followed suit in placing more emphasis on 
these same goals, some local job-training authorities continued to demand 
low-cost placements from their service providers (Heinrich 1999). Heinrich 
found that service providers were aware of the new federal and state 
policy directives but focused primarily on job placement rates and costs 
per placement in their efforts, largely because these were the outcomes 
directly rewarded with contract renewals and other forms of recognition 
at the local level.  
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The change under WIA to a system in which regional USDOL 
representatives, state authorities, and local representatives engage in 
negotiations to determine performance standards might have presented 
an opportunity for greater coordination in aligning these principals’ 
interests and reducing problems associated with divided agent efforts. 
In practice, however, the lack of formal adjustment mechanisms for 
standards under the new system only exacerbated these problems. After 
interviewing WIA program administrators in 50 states and visiting fi ve 
sites, the GAO (2002) concluded that “the need to meet performance 
levels may be the driving factor in deciding who receives WIA-funded 
services at the local level” (p. 14). The GAO report and a subsequent 
study (Heinrich 2004) describe how some local areas have limited ac-
cess to services for individuals who they perceive are less likely to get 
and retain a job. For example, some have responded to these pressures 
by augmenting the screening process for determining registrations or 
by limiting registrations of harder-to-serve job seekers, including dislo-
cated workers whose preprogram earnings were more diffi cult to replace. 
A Texas offi cial indicated that even with Texas’s relatively sophisti-
cated statistical model for setting and adjusting performance standards, 
adequate adjustments had not been made for economic conditions.
In her empirical analysis of WIA program performance across the 
states, Heinrich (2004) estimates OLS regressions using as dependent 
variables states’ actual performance levels, and in separate regressions, 
the differentials between their actual performance and the negotiated 
standards. The objective of these analyses is to assess the relationship of 
local participant characteristics and economic conditions to measured 
performance and to determine if “adjustments” made in the negotiation 
process (i.e., to establish fair standards) were effective in accounting for 
these factors. For example, states with a comparatively high number of 
high school dropouts participating in their programs could have negoti-
ated a lower employment retention rate or earnings change standard 
in anticipation that their less educated populations would have fewer 
or less attractive employment opportunities. If the states’ initial pro-
cesses for adjusting performance standards through such negotiations 
had worked as intended, one would expect to see fewer or weaker re-
lationships between the performance differentials and these baseline 
characteristics (compared to their relationships with actual performance 
levels). In other words, only state and local program efforts—not char-
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acteristics of their populations or economic conditions that were beyond 
program managers’ control—should explain why they met, exceeded, 
or fell below their negotiated performance standards.
Heinrich estimates separate regressions for each of the 17 per-
formance standards for these two dependent variables. In both sets of 
models, characteristics such as race, education, and work history were 
statistically signifi cant predictors of performance relative to some stan-
dards, suggesting that adjustments for participant characteristics were 
inadequate. In fact, the most consistent, negative predictors of perfor-
mance levels and differentials were unemployment rates. These fi ndings 
confi rm that states were not prepared to adjust for what turned out to 
be signifi cant risks of failure to meet performance standards due to the 
economic downturn and aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Dynamics
Under JTPA, the practice of pegging the performance standard to 
the performance of the training center at the 25th percentile in the prior 
period likely contributed to unsustainable changes in the level of effort 
exerted by training centers over time. If training centers responded to 
incentives and strived to exceed the performance standard, the distribu-
tion of training centers’ performances would shift to the right, implying 
that the new 25th percentile (which would become the basis of the stan-
dard in the next year) would exceed the old 25th percentile. As long as 
training centers can keep up with effort, the standard grows ever higher, 
and the amount of effort necessary to meet the standard also increases, 
leading to higher outcomes and future increases in the standard. More 
realistically, at least if performance improvement or infl ation goes on 
for long enough, such a system implies that some training centers will 
eventually fall behind and fail to meet the standard. If such a system 
would be used for long enough, performance infl ation should eventu-
ally stop and about 25 percent of training centers would perform below 
the standard: an unsatisfactory outcome. 
Table 5.2 reports the departure points for a number of the original 
JTPA performance measures (i.e., the adult employment rate at ter-
mination, the adult welfare employment rate at termination, and the 
youth employment rate at termination). These departure points were 
consistently set at the 25th percentile of a previous year’s distribution of 
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outcomes. As predicted, Table 5.2 shows a general increase in departure 
points over this period of the early JTPA years. The departure points in 
1986–1987 were much higher than those in 1984–1985, which is not 
unexpected given that they were based on performance under JTPA’s 
predecessor program and the initial nine months of JTPA (during which 
training centers were not subject to incentive policies).
Under WIA, the USDOL strongly encouraged states and localities 
to set standards that would motivate improved performance from year 
to year. In fact, in the effort to promote “continuous performance im-
provement,” the states set standards that not only required that they 
improve over time, but also that the magnitude of the improvements in-
crease from year to year. This approach gave states an implicit incentive 
to negotiate lower standards in the early years, and some of the states, 
in fact, attempted to do this. North Carolina, for example, was asked by 
the USDOL to increase the level of its negotiated standards before the 
start of the WIA program, as they were judged to be too low relative 
to other states and North Carolina’s past performance (Heinrich 2004). 
For the most part, though, states and localities complied with WIA re-
quirements by building yearly increases into the standards. 
As the analysis by Heinrich shows, however, this approach failed 
due to the lack of adjustments for changing economic conditions in 
the early years of WIA. Two years into the program’s operation, 38 
states were identifi ed as having failed to achieve at least 80 percent 
of their performance goals for two consecutive years and were at risk 
for sanctions. More generally, these fi ndings suggest that the types of 
formal performance standards adjustments made in the JTPA system 
Table 5.2  Departure Points for First-Generation JTPA Standards
Program year
Adult employment
rate at termination (%)
Adult welfare 





1984 47.0 — 21.4
1985 57.1 — 36.4
1986, 1987 62.4 51.3 43.3
1988, 1989 68.0 56.0 45.0
NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Courty and Marschke (2004b).
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to control for factors outside program managers’ control are critical to 
the success of a system intended to promote continuous performance 
improvements. The presence of conditions that drive ratchet effects in 
WIA also suggests that the design of performance incentives may not 
always follow a strictly economic logic. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have drawn from the information economics, 
contract theory, and public administration literatures to discern basic 
lessons for the construction of performance standards. We demonstrate 
the relevance of these lessons in the context of two public programs, 
the U.S. JTPA and WIA federal job training programs. We fi nd evi-
dence that performance measurement system designers have attempted 
to “level the playing fi eld” over time to provide equivalent performance 
incentives across states and localities. Performance standard adjustment 
methods were established to account for “shocks” that are outside an 
agent’s control and to reduce the risk faced by the agent. Policymakers 
have also tried to reduce the potential negative distortions due to hidden 
information. 
At the same time, it is not surprising that in a public sector program 
with multiple principals and political relationships infl uencing ad-
ministration, the evidence suggests that these problems were not fully 
resolved. We identifi ed some negative dynamic properties of the perfor-
mance measurement system that threaten its sustainability. In both JTPA 
and WIA, the dynamics of performance benchmarking and the chal-
lenges of effectively adjusting performance expectations for external 
infl uences beyond program managers’ control likely contributed to in-
effi ciencies and generated incentives to infl uence performance in ways 
other than increasing effort. Selecting trainees according to observed 
characteristics associated with their labor market success, limiting the 
availability of more intensive training services, and demonstrating lower 
performance early on to allow for performance improvements over 
time are some examples of strategic behaviors that were unintended 
by system designers and potentially harmful to the system and pro-
gram outcomes. In the WIA system, where rewards (up to $3 million in 
chapter5.indd   120 4/27/2011   9:45:39 AM
Setting the Standards: Performance Targets and Benchmarks   121
grants) and sanctions (up to a 5 percent reduction in grants) had poten-
tially important implications for program functioning, the performance 
standards should have provided appropriate incentives and feedback to 
operators about the effectiveness of their activities in improving service 
quality and participant outcomes. 
Politicians, along with economists and private sector representa-
tives, have been calling for a more businesslike administration of 
government for more than a century, most recently in the “reinventing 
government” and New Public Management reform initiatives. The use 
of performance measurement systems and bonuses in public sector pro-
grams has been a key component of these recent initiatives, although 
both policymakers and scholars have begun to uncover evidence of their 
“dark side,” including some of the negative or unintended consequences 
described in this study (Radin 2000). Our research confi rms both the 
potential of these systems to be effectively managed to promote per-
formance improvements, and the limitations of these systems’ design, 
which are guided not only by economic theory, but also by political 
demands and the complexities of representative governance. Although 
our research doesn’t point to cogent solutions for all of the problems 
that public sector performance measurement system designers face, we 
do suggest some specifi c actions public managers can take to improve 
these systems, such as the proper incorporation of different types of 
information into the standard, coordination among multiple principals 
with confl icting interests, and more careful attention to the dynamic im-
plications of performance measurement. More generally, we also hope 
that the framework for analysis of these issues that we present might 
better guide policymakers’ or other scholars’ understanding and consid-
eration of how these systems and public program performance might 
be improved.
Notes
1. Both Dixit and Burgess and Ratto (2003) evaluate this literature in the context of 
incentive provision inside government organizations.
2. In New York City alone, it is estimated that about 430,000 job-months and $2.8 
billion in wages were lost in the three months following the September 11 attacks 
(Makinen 2002).
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